

Disarmament, Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR): A Case Study of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan.

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Abstract


Unlike Sierra Leone and Liberia's DDRR program that is generally considered a success, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Resettlement in Sudan turn out a tricky end result. In this paper, we will look at the overall goal of this project, the DDRR in general, its goals and preconditions. In the body of the paper, we will look in detail at the backgrounds to the conflicts in all the three countries, pay special attention to the implementation of the DDRR in Liberia and Sierra Leon and the challenges and successes of the two programs, with the view to bringing out the lessons learned from them in order to formulate something of a possible template for a successful DDRR in South Sudan. [New York Science Journal 2010; 3(6):6-19]. (ISSN 1554 – 0200).

Keywords: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Resettlement, war, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan etc

Introduction

The African continent is spotted with conflicts in practically all its sub-regions, West, North, East and Central just to name a few, with astronomical lost of lives and properties. In this paper, the case study of Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Sudan is the premise with regards to the DDRR program that took place in the aforementioned countries. Again, a background account of the South Sudan conflict and the failed DDRR will be looked at. According to the international standards, a successful DDRR is an applied strategy for executing peacekeeping operation, usually employed by the United Nations and the Post-conflict government. It entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons and ammunitions, disbanding of armed group militias and rehabilitating and reintegration of former combatants into civil society, in order to ensure a possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict.

Historical Background to the Liberian Civil War



SKETCH MAP OF LIBERIA



Liberia is a small West African country that experienced relative peace and credible progress until the 1980s when a conflation of wrong policy choices, and consequently, outbreak of a devastating civil war in December 1989, damaged every infrastructure, completely reversing the course of the socio-economic and political development. The intervention of the international community and the cessation of hostilities, and the ensuing elections in 1997, with Charles Taylor becoming president, ushered in unprecedented euphoria and a new lease of hope that Liberia was firm on the road towards rehabilitation and recovery of its socio-political and

economic infrastructures, and hence the resumption of growth and development. This euphoria faded into disappointment and disillusionment, as the elections failed to produce the much anticipated growth and prosperity. Barely two years following the elections, due to sustained and indiscriminate repressive rule and other forms of bad governance, rebellion broke out, destroying the gains made so far. This conflict planned and launched by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and headed by Sekou Damate Conneh, began in the northwest in Lofa County on the Guinean-Liberian border. It later spread to and engulfed twelve of the fifteen counties of the country. The conflict involved the following fighting forces: LURD, and Movement for Democracy and Elections in Liberia (MODEL), and the Government of Liberia (GOL) and its various security forces (Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), Special Operations Division(SOD), a unit within the Liberian National Police (LNP), Special Security Service(SSS), and a host of militia/paramilitary groups). In all, three main factions, each with its own interests and positions participated in the war.

The international community revisited Liberia, and since the previous DDRR program failed, this time around, it must succeed.

Primary Actors

The National Patriotic Party Government of Liberia: Charles Ghankay Taylor was the president against whom the rebels were fighting to return the country to normalcy since in their view Taylor had made Liberia a pariah state. Upon assuming office in 1997, Taylor reneged on most of what was agreed upon in the peace agreement, which ended the first war, 1989-1997. For example, security sector reforms to build confidence in opponents were never done, and apart from the regular security forces of the AFL, LNP, SSS, and the ATU, many irregular security personnel operated in certain key ministries, corporations and agencies. The ATU was a force of elite loyalists, the most experienced former fighters. This force had many foreign nationals, mostly from Burkina Faso, the Gambia and the RUF from Sierra Leone. The Special Security Service has the traditional role of protecting the president and his or her family. Under Taylor, they were both well- and heavily-armed. The AFL, the national army, was neglected, and so were the regular police. He created a force within the police called Special Operation Division (SOD) which was heavily armed. Its notoriety for human rights abuses earned it the name 'Sons of the Devil.' These forces, together with the many irregulars were constantly used as tools of

repression. With the outbreak of the war, all these were part of the fighting forces, but all to no avail.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

This is the main rebel movement against Taylor's regime, and as expected it comprised most of his arch rivals during the first round of the civil war. LURD was ULIMO under a different name. ULIMO was a merger of three groups: Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims dominated by the Mandingo ethnic group and headed by Alhaji Kromah, a Mandingo. This movement was formed in Guinea; the Liberian Peace Council, headed by Dr. George S. Boley, a predominantly Khran organization, President Doe's ethnic group; and, the Liberian United Defense Force (LUDF), by Gen. Albert B.S. Karpah. Members of this group were elements of the former AFL. It comprised mainly the Khran ethnic group. The last two were founded in Sierra Leone. ULIMO fought alongside the Sierra Leone Army following the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) incursion into Sierra Leone, before entering Liberia in 1992, primarily to halt Taylor's advance and to stop him taking power by force. Its main positions were: preventing Taylor from taking power militarily; denouncing hostage taking; respecting the territorial integrity of neighbors; adhering to all international norms and conventions on human rights and humanitarian laws. Its interests included peace and security to enable its targeted Mandingo and Khran ethnic groups return to Liberia without fear of being killed; acquisition of more territories from the NPFL, to strengthen their bargaining power at peace talks; acquisition of power through constitutional means. Rivalry for power split the movement along ethnic lines with the Mandingo group forming the ULIMO-K after Alhaji Kromah who became its leader, and the Khran group formed the ULIMO-J after Roosevelt Johnson who headed it. As said earlier LURD was formed by practically the same people and their positions and interests were basically the same. The only difference this time was that the struggle was for the removal of Taylor from power, not against another rebel leader. Like ULIMO, LURD drew most of its supports from neighboring Guinea and Sierra Leone because Taylor had exported war to these countries. Members of ULIMO were largely Liberian refugees who took refuge in Guinea and Sierra Leone, and returned as a rival to Taylor's National Patriotic Front Liberia (NPFL).

Model

This was the second largest rebel faction formed against Taylor. Although it entered the

struggle very late, it contributed greatly to weakening the regime. It was led by Thomas Yaya Nimely, a Khran. This movement was Ivorian-backed in retaliation for Taylor's support to dissident forces against the government of President Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivory Coast. International Crisis Group report titled, "Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm" had this to say:

"...President Taylor increasingly employs rebel troops in western Cote d'Ivoire, which he treats as a second front against the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy(LURD) insurgency that threatens his rule. Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo is paying and arming just anyone to balance Taylor's support for his foes. His largesse enabled the formation of a new LURD faction, which calls itself the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).It is advancing against¹ Taylor at the same time as it challenges, for primacy in the rebellion, both the LURD leadership based in Guinea and its military wing fighting on Liberian soil."²

MODEL, a southern-based faction entered Liberia from Ivory Coast in April of 2003, causing a large displacement of people, many of whom had run away from north, west and central Liberia to escape the atrocities by LURD and government forces. As its position, MODEL wanted Taylor to step down, and it strongly deplored the partitioning of the country between the government and LURD. Its interest was peace and security, and development.

The Secondary Actors

The role of the secondary actors in this conflict deserves mention, because they contributed to and fuelled the conflict in many diverse ways, with dire regional consequences. Here, we are looking at those players, whose roles were clear. They included Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast on the one hand, and Burkina Faso and Libya on the other. In the first group are countries destabilized by Taylor through support for dissident forces in each of these neighboring states to launch his kind of war against their governments. Typical example was the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) led by Foday Sabanoh Sankoh, his protégé, both of whom trained in guerrilla warfare in Libya, thanks to the support of the Libyan leader Col. Muamar Gaddafi. So the Guinean and Sierra Leonean support for LURD and the Ivorian support to MODEL were

reprisal actions. In addition to financial and material supports, Guinea and Sierra Leone gave LURD safe passage into Liberia, as evident in LURD's Damate Conneh's August 28th, 2008 testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Monrovia, Liberia indicted that during the war, Sierra Leone and Guinea allowed the LURD rebels free passage, through their borders, with arms without any question from them. Both Burkina Faso and Libya supported Taylor not for their own security but for personal gains and some historical reasons. Campaore was Boigny's son-in-law and helped Boigny in the campaign against Doe by supporting Taylor in the first round of the conflict. He in turn introduced Taylor to the Libyan leader Col. Muamar Gaddafi.He and Gaddafi trained and financed Taylor's rebellion. His interests were no different from Boigny's, which were personal gain from the diamond trade and the retaliation for Aldolphus's death, son of the slain President Tolbert. This support continued during the second round of the conflict, this time more for gains. Gaddafi was the chief financier of the rebellion in its formative days; he also trained the rebels. His support for Taylor continued, though not as glaringly as before since he was trying to clean his image internationally. In the first round, his support stemmed from the thorny relation with America and Doe's friendship with the country. So, a rebellion against America's ally or friend was an opportunity to settle scores with America.

The Intervening Actors

Inter-Faith Movement of Liberia, ICG, ECOWAS, OAU (AU), UN and the US .The Inter-Faith Movement of Liberia was very instrumental in the peace efforts since the start of the conflict in 1989. It was the first organization to begin the peace process following the outbreak of the war. ECOWAS, AU UN and many other groups also played pivotal and more decisive role from the time they intervened to the end of the conflict. To bring some level of stability in Liberia, ECOWAS deployed a stabilization force called ECOMIL until the UN deployed its robust mission UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia). All the interveners were unanimous on the need for hostilities to stop and on the faction availing themselves of the opportunities offered by the peace process. Their interests were, respect for the rule of law, regional peace and stability, and stopping the bloodbath. ECOWAS, together with AU, and the UN handled all subsequent peace initiatives, while the United States gave financial and logistical support. The role of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), simply called Contact Group (CG) in the resolution

of the conflict was great and deserves special mention. The CG was established in September 2003 after the realization that the international community needed to do more to stem the spread of the conflict to other West African states, as the crisis had almost engulfed the Mano River basin countries of Sierra Leone, and Guinea and the Ivory Coast. The group comprised the US, the UK, France, three Security Council members, ECOWAS and the AU, a composition crucial for effective action and implementation of decisions reached on Liberia. Among other things, the CG wanted the following:

1. Factions to negotiate immediate and unconditional cease-fire
2. Taylor to step down at the end of his term
3. Establishment of an interim administration
4. Postponement of the October 14th 2003 elections
5. Elections to be held under conducive atmosphere of no violence and intimidation

Although, its primary aim of securing immediate cease-fire was not achieved as hoped, it succeeded in convincing Taylor that prevailing conditions were not favorable for free and fair elections, and hence the agreement on the delay of the ballot, something Taylor had vehemently opposed; in addition, he also agreed on the formation of the joint assessment mission of UN, EU, and ECOWAS tasked with determining the ideal time for the ballot. In the end, the CG had all factions agree on a cease-fire and the cessation of human rights violations, making it crystal clear what the consequences would be in case of violation. The CG acted with the abiding knowledge of the wider regional implications of the conflict and the need to tackle it accordingly. It thus emphasized the need for effective coordination among the key external players: UK, US, France, UN, EU and ECOWAS. UK and France had a more crucial part to play since they were already actively engaged in resolving conflict in their former colonies of Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, respectively. Liberia had something missing, the US was not as involved as the other two, and it should to get to get more support for its stepchild. The CG welcomed Mali to mediate on behalf of ECOWAS. The group's emphasis on cease-fire by LURD stemmed from the fact that that would foster security guarantee among MRU countries, and between Liberia and the Ivory Coast, thus creating a comprehensive program for the DDRR, and restructuring and reforming the AFL and the LNP. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana was the initiative of the CG and Liberians, with the support of the UNSC Resolution 1509.

The Implementation of the DDRR Program In Liberia

Disarmament and Collection of Weapons



Liberia, like many other African countries, is reeling from the impacts of a devastating civil war, a war fought in two phases: 1989-1996, and 1999-2003. The DDRR under the second phase is our concern here. Charles Taylor launched the first war against President Samuel Kayon Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), and he emerged the victor in the postwar elections, becoming president of Liberia. His repressive regime caused another round of physical fighting in 1999 and extending into 2003, involving various forces: AFL, MODEL, LURD, GOL militia/paramilitary. The war ended with the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement initiated by Liberians and the International Contact Group on Liberia, supported by the UNSC Resolution 1509. This agreement had as one of its key components, as it were, the DDRR program, as prerequisite for facilitating humanitarian assistance, restoration of civil authority, promotion of economic growth and sustainable development. The DDRR program was jointly initiated and implemented by national and international stakeholders: UNDP, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the Government of Liberia (GOL), NGOs, and a number of other UN and international agencies. The Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) coordinated the implementation of the program. It comprised UNDP, UNMIL, and the National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR). UNDP administered the DDRR Trust Fund and the funds of the program. The DD phase ended in 2004 with the disarmament of 103,019 LURD, MODEL and GOL combatants. Of these 22,370 were women, 8,532 boys, and 2,440 girls. More than 28,314 weapons, 33,604 pieces of heavy munitions, and 6,486,136 rounds of small arms were collected during the formal disarmament period; and an additional 252 weapons and 3,513 rounds of

ammunition. With DD successfully over in 2004, RR set in and expanded to include the whole country. Hence the establishment of field referral offices which provided the backbone of the rehabilitation and reintegration RR rested on the pillars of formal education, vocational training and social reintegration. During the DD, ex-combatants were asked to identify their preferred type of rehabilitation program: formal education or vocational training.

Formal education: UNDP sponsored ex-combatants in 366 schools and colleges in Liberia. The formal education component of the RR helped up to 21,900 students and recorded very low failure and drop out rates. A further 1,500 students graduated from computer schools. UNDP also conducted workshops and reviews to identify important issues and potential areas of improvement.

Vocational Training: Through vocational training UNDP provided a means of income generation and thus livelihoods for ex-combatants. It also provided skilled labor force to support the economic recovery of the Liberian economy. This was done in partnership with approximately 200 NGOs and UN agencies across the country. Ex-combatants were trained in mechanics, electronics, construction, soap making, carpentry, and plumbing, among others.

Social Reintegration: Since reintegration is more than learning to earn a living, UNDP strengthened the social reintegration aspects of the RR process by facilitating psycho-trauma counseling and human rights education into all RR projects. The DDRR program formally ended in October 2007 following the successful disarmament and demobilization of 103,019 ex-combatants and the reintegration of 90,000. The program contributed to consolidating national security through the DDRR of ex-combatants into society.

Challenges

The DDRR program in Liberia was challenged by events in the sub-region: DDRR had just taken place in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast had yet to begin its own, and Guinea was reeling from the incursion by forces allegedly supported by Charles Taylor. This situation, coupled with the lack of coordination and communication between UN officials in Liberia and their counterparts in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast posed a serious threat as money entered the equation for weapons, creating a ready market for the combatants and mercenaries in the region. Equally important was the case of Ivory Coast \$ 900 for weapons, causing agitation in Liberia among the ex-combatants who, understandably, wanted to withhold their gun and demand for more money for them. The likelihood for crossing into neighboring Ivory for a weapon sale became very

high. Although the amount was reduced to \$830, it was still huge relative to the \$300 given in Liberia. Regarding this, Ryan Nichols said, "...This disparity may not only have significantly undermined Liberia's DDRR process by providing fighters extra incentive to hold on to their weapons but also may be contributing to the ongoing instability in Cote d'Ivoire by encouraging armed Liberian fighters to cross the border."³ (16). Such was the nature of the chaos that loomed, that several meetings were held under the auspices of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) located in Dakar, to promote cooperation among the UN missions in the region.

Given the complex nature of the program, timing was huge and of the essence. Following the symbolic destruction of weapons on December 1st, 2003, the DD component of the program formally began on December 7th at Camp Schefflein without adequate preparation in terms of sensitization, troop presence and deployment, logistics and funding. This rushed action was taken to please donors scheduled to conference in January 2004. Therefore, the program ran into problems as soon as it began due to the high turn-out of ex-combatants for disarmament: instead of the 250 expected that day, well over one a thousand came, overwhelming the team, site, food and water. Towards nightfall, hundreds were still lined up, weapons in hand. What compounded the situation was that the \$300 rumored was not offered. Riot broke out as frustrated ex-combatants ran amuck, brandishing weapons, setting roadblocks, while some drove into the city on vehicle tops. This chaos lasted for two days, running, causing nine deaths, injuries and property destruction. The program was suspended indefinitely on December 17, for the team to go back to the drawing board to strategize, following the realization that the launch of the program without UNMIL troops, as a credible deterrence, was premature. No adequate and proper sensitization preceded the launch. So the rushed start undermined the implementation in terms of trust and confidence building. It also cost lives and property. Closely connected to the above and equally important was the issue of funding, coupled with the underestimation of the number to be disarmed. The initial 38, 000 estimate turned out to be sharply inadequate. Faction leaders failed to submit comprehensive lists of their fighters to the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), which caused the poor estimate. No sooner the program commenced than funds practically ran out, making provision of crucial services to ex-combatants difficult, if not impossible. Poor timing, coupled with sluggish financial commitment of donors played into the hands of the

uncooperative ex-combatants to whom the program was unemployment, since disarmament would take a way their bargaining chip and only source of livelihood. They were socialized into lawlessness, rendering war economy and other ill-gotten wealth a norm, not an exception. Such false start sent the wrong signal strengthening their feeling of the non-existence of alternative for them. Holding on to weapons, as a wait-and-see strategy was not uncommon; a situation which immensely slowed down the process, with very grave consequences, as sporadic incidents of armed robbery and other forms of crimes punctuated life in the country.

Equally important was the issue of personal agendas of politicians and policy makers who, like the uncooperative ex-combatants, exploited the poor timing, insufficient funds, and the attitudes of the ex-combatants, to their advantage, as they jockeyed feverishly for power, positions and gains. For them, the more the program dragged on the better. Even among the DDRR team, NGOs, it was widely believed that swift and successful completion of the program would throw them out of work. These challenges competed and conspired to slow-drive the DDRR in Liberia.


Successes

Despite the challenges the program faced, the DDRR program following the 1999-2003 war, unlike the previous one, succeeded in many ways, positively impacting the whole sub-regional security dynamics. The ubiquity of Liberian fighters in conflicts in neighboring countries was unquestionable. Again mercenaries in the region were also fighting in Liberia, making the disarmament process a regional operation, not just one focused on ex-combatants within Liberian borders. Therefore, beginning and completing the process, amid uncertainties helped control the movement of combatants, as some got actively engaged in productive activities. The increased presence of troops in the country and their deployment at border crossings minimized cross-border crimes, involving weapon smuggling and sales. Through the DDRR, ex-combatants acquired training and relevant skills, empowering them to earn a decent living. This provided a viable and credible alternative to war economy which is a major obstacle to a successful DDRR. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren have this to say about war economies: "The 'seductive tenacity of war economies' constitutes an important barrier to the success of the DDRR and of post conflict development as a whole, and no strategy of DDRR can succeed without taking this aspect into account."⁴ Acquisition of skills contributed to the

economic recovery process as it created a labor force for the country, and a viable alternative to the war economy.

On the whole, the program enabled Liberia to make significant moves on the path towards peace and stability, a precondition for the resumption of normal socio-political and economic activities in a post conflict nation. So, despite the challenges, some of which put the DDRR program at risk of derailment, the program ushered in a moment of stability in the country, a fact borne out by the successful interventions of other contributing partners to the post conflict reconstruction and development efforts. Its positive implications for sub-regional peace and security need not be overemphasized.

Background of Sierra Leone & Route Cause of Conflict



Sierra Leone is situated in the West Coast of Africa. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to explore the land and gave Sierra Leone its name, which means lion mountains in Portuguese. A former British colony, Sierra Leone gained its independence and became a sovereign state on April 27, 1961. The population is approximately five million people and the country comprises 20 native African tribes.

The Civil War, which began in the eastern town of Kailahun near the Liberia border with Sierra Leone, claimed thousands of lives mostly women and children. The conflict began under complex circumstances that involved both internal and external factors. Rebel forces claimed to have taken up arms because of the never-ending corruption and injustices of the then All Peoples Congress government, the longest governing party of Sierra Leone since the end of British colonial rule. The

richer ruling class of Sierra Leone, for example, increasingly offended poor rural citizens. Externally, rebel groups within Sierra Leone received support from the Liberian President, Charles Taylor. President Taylor's main objective in dealing with Sierra Leone was to gain control of the rich diamond fields in the eastern part of the country. Precious mineral resources, which the country is widely known for, over time served to fuel and worsen the tension until the breakout of widespread hostilities.

SIERRA LEONE REGIONAL MAP BY DISTRICT.



As seen in the above map, Sierra Leone borders Liberia to the southeast, the Republic of Guinea to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the West. Reacting to the system of many years of corrupt, unjust, and despotic rule, a British trained Sierra Leone military officer, Foday Sankoh (picture below)



RUF Leader Foday Sankoh


formed the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in March of 1991. These rebel movement of the RUF

saw themselves as freedom fighters. Low ranking military Officers (AFRC) also retreated to the bush and became a second rebel faction to the RUF. Mining diamonds from the rich field in the southeast and selling through then Liberia President was their main source of finance. The precious mineral resources which the country is widely known for fueled and worsen the conflict.

Primarily, the then President of Sierra Leone His Excellency Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabba and the RUF rebel leader Foday Sankoh signed the accord with other parties as moral guarantors to the agreement. These two parties were known to be the primary actors of the agreement. As a prominent factor in the root cause of the conflict, Liberia's Charles Taylor is undoubtedly known to be another actor. The United Kingdom, the African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations all played the role as mediators or intervening actors.

After the events of May 2000, the need for a new cease-fire was seen necessary to strengthen the peace process. This agreement was signed in Abuja in November of that year.

DDR Process in Sierra Leone; Challenges And Successes.




In late 2000, Guinean forces entered Sierra Leone to attack RUF bases from which attacks had been launched against Liberian dissidents in Guinea. A second Abuja Agreement, in May 2001, set the stage for a resumption of DDR on a wide scale and a significant reduction in hostilities.

As disarmament has progressed, the government began to reassert its authority in formerly rebel-held areas. By early 2002, some 72,000 ex-combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, although many still awaited re-integration assistance. On January 18, 2002 then President Kabbah declared the civil war officially over. In May 2002 President Kabbah and his party, the SLPP, won landslide victories in the presidential and legislative elections. Kabbah was re-elected for a five-year term. The RUF political wing, the RUFPP, failed to win a single seat in parliament. The elections were marked by irregularities and allegations of fraud, but not to a degree to significantly affect the outcome.

Many theorists have cited the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and

Reintegration (DDRR) effort in Sierra Leone as a United Nations success story.



Though program was proven to be a success overall, yet was faced with very many challenges. Misrepresentation of the program's priorities by contributors (donors) was seen as one of the challenges of the DDRR program. Resource allocations as well as some donors not following through on most of the pledges made can be looked as an impediment in achieving the objectives of the program.

As Richard Williamson, U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations posited, in his Statement at the UN Security Council Workshop on West Africa "On DDRR, it is critical to have a coordinated mechanism through which the host country, international community and the UN can address the financial and logistical issues related to DDR activities and ensure follow up by donors on their commitments. This has been an element lacking in Sierra Leone and the DDR effort has suffered. The "reintegration" element of DDR has proven the most

frustrating challenge of the process in Sierra Leone. Reintegration activities remain far short of what is needed to ensure stability in the future" (US State department; released from US mission to the United Nations 2002). It is against these backgrounds that programs such as the DDRR to certain extent can be deceiving, and sometimes revealed the ineffectiveness of reintegration. Though the agricultural sector make available three-fourths of the jobs in Sierra Leone, yet the DDRR programs in post conflict Sierra Leone trained former combatants as plumbers, carpenters, or mechanics. Donors did hope that ex-combatants would settle as farmers, but the reintegration programs they provided did not meet the requirements that would have made this possible.

In the reintegration programs, combatants are given the option to choose a field of training and thereby received logistical support for that area chosen. To the disappointment of the donors providing these logistical supports, the ex-combatants choose the carrier part for supplies and support for kits that are in high demand, and primarily for which could be resold after use at highest value. Unfortunately, hoes and seeds that are primarily agricultural products don't yield much dividend from the standpoints of the ex-combatants and very few decided to choose that part. A six-month stipend was provided for ex-combatants who entered vocational training while farmers were not supported at all, since it was assumed they were already knowledgeable about farming. There were many hidden deterrent for ex-combatants to enter the agricultural field including lack of assurances that the agricultural sector will enhance them a flourishing future. As a result of this uneven distribution of resources in terms of services, training, and aid, many youth overlooked agricultural training in the hope of something more rewarding.

The failure of the donor community to provide sufficient infrastructure reconstruction and employment generation has made livelihoods in agriculture for ex-combatants and the entire youth population flawed. A small number of public works schemes were undertaken during the reintegration process. For example, UNAMSIL soldiers employed ex-combatants on road construction projects, yet roads remain in extremely poor shape. International financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have also been active in reconstruction and have compounded the economic challenges faced by youth in Sierra Leone. IMF's insistence on privatization of public enterprises has made rebuilding the country's infrastructure an impossible task for a government whose budget is comprised of 65% foreign aid. Opportunities in the agricultural sector have been further subdued by international persistence on

removing trade barriers, which has allowed cheaper Asian rice to swamp the local market.

This sort of double standard in the part of the international community condensed the ability of small farmers to compete. A combination of the misguided reintegration programs and the demands of international financial institutions have resulted in a lack of infrastructure and access to productive lands, appropriate training, and increased frustration among youths in general. One economic sector into which youth have been integrated is diamond mining, which the country is widely known for. Diamonds and gold accounts for 20% of the country's total GDP and 65% of its foreign exchange. The exploitation of natural resources in Sierra Leone such as the smuggling of diamonds in particular was a driving force of the conflict. An extremely valuable natural resource such as diamonds have the opportunity to contribute to economic development and poverty alleviation in one of the poorest countries on Earth. Regrettably, lack of government regulation, corruption on the part of government officials themselves, and illegal smuggling continue to be an impediment to the nation's successes.

The Kimberly Process for instance put forward by the United Nations in response to the crisis of conflict diamonds, has not been effectively implemented in Sierra Leone. Due to smuggling, Government officials for the most part have attributed a decline in official diamond exports. A major challenge for the reconstruction process has been using diamond revenues to promote development, a task that is out of the question without government regulation. A positive step in this direction was the creation of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), whose aim is to invest diamond revenues in the respective diamond-producing areas. This effort has been undermined by lack of regulation of mining companies and Paramount Chiefs. When you talk to the natives like the youths they strongly believe that their land is being taken away from their communities for resource management, which they are not benefiting from. Alienation of youths by the government and mining companies has only been enhanced by the number of youth who have been attracted to the mines in search of employment. In Kono district for instance, one of the most important mining districts in Sierra Leone, thousands of youth ages ten to sixteen are involved in mining, often in exceptionally exploitative conditions. The lack of government oversight of mining areas makes it unlikely that the conditions for youth there will change in the near future.

To a larger extent, the destruction caused by war cannot be fully comprehended by those who

were not its victims in some way. The international donor community has failed to change the context in which conflict originally emerged in Sierra Leone. Officials remain corrupt, chiefs retain power, injustice prevails, unemployment is pervasive, and bitterness at the reconstruction process is widespread. International reconstruction efforts must endeavor to understand and anticipate their consequences, both intended and unintended. In breaching the gap between theory and reality, what is left undone is often more important than what is done. Reconstruction and aid must demand transparency from recipient governments while simultaneously providing support and expertise to implement systems of accountability. Reintegration projects cannot provide a short-term fix, but must work within the existing economic framework to provide employment that will make lasting contributions to individuals' livelihoods. Schools can be rebuilt, but will remain empty unless funds are allowed to be used for teacher salaries and materials. Many lessons can be identified from the failures of Sierra Leone. Sweeping political, judicial, and economic reconstruction will falter if it does not consider and adequately address the underlying causes of the conflict. Remember the primary objective of the DDRR program, was to disarm combatants and reintegrate them back into society to ensure peace and development of the nation. This doesn't seem visible with all the challenges of the route cause of the conflict.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Implementation.

The successful case in point of Sierra Leone can be used to draw important general lessons for future activities in disarmament and demobilization programs. This paradigm with reference to the peace process, the institutional framework, and the disarmament and demobilization operations can be effectively implemented elsewhere based on lessons learned. The development of a DDRR program advanced parallel to the political process, and was heavily influenced by its successes and failures. Political issues such as amnesty for the rebels, and technical issues such as timeframes for demobilization linked the DDR program to the peace agreement.

The overriding lesson is that DDR can complement a peace agreement, but it cannot lead the political process. While DDR technical considerations should be integrated into peace agreements, flexibility is needed to avoid unrealistic timetables, commitments and expectations. The idea of amnesty, truth and reconciliation proceedings, and

war crime tribunals should be discussed early on in the peace process for effective implementations.


The Peace process and demobilization disarmament cannot be implemented in the absence of security for the disarming parties and international personnel. There is always tendency for interruption of the process in the absence of sustainable peace. Mass information campaigns are essential in disseminating the details of the peace agreements and sensitizing the rank and file of the rebel groups.

All primary, secondary and intervening actors shall be ready to commit themselves to firm political will and readiness to coordinate efforts. National coordinating institutions that are capable of planning, implementing and overseeing a nationally driven disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program should be ready to take the lead in this effort. Outside support is needed in the form of technical advice and, above all, substantial donor funding. Constant contact and communication with the warring factions at all level is key to the effective implementation of the program. Improved security also allowed for a quicker return of ex-combatants to their areas of origin which they are more comfortable to stay. Rapid implementation can destabilize reintegration programs, thus compromising their effectiveness.

Finally, Civilian organizations such as civil societies should participate in the disarmament stage to assist with specific programs catering for the needs of children and dependants. More importantly, Child-soldiers should be separated from the rest of the demobilizing groups. All of the above emphatically mentioned, if utilize as recommended are crucial and key for further implementation in a DDR program.

DDRR in Post-Conflict South Sudan

Flag and Map of Semi-autonomous South Sudan



After the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), between South Sudan and Khartoum-based government, the issue of insecurity remains pervasive in various parts of South Sudan. As in common parts of East Africa, pastoralists continue to clash over cattle and access to resources (water and pasture). Relations among ethnic groups have become politicized, fracturing the diverse demographic landscape with mistrust and competition. After decades of war and proxy arming by all sides, firearm ownership is widespread throughout the ten states in South Sudan. Just four years after the CPA, President Salva Kiir issued an *Operational Order* (executive decree) or directive, calling for comprehensive civilian disarmament (DDRR) across all ten states of South Sudan. This initiative was supported by the SPLA, as well as state governors were tasked with collecting all civilian weapons within a six-month window. Had this been successfully implemented, it would have been the largest such exercise ever conducted in South Sudan, involving thousands of soldiers with a completely open mandate and an authorization to use force in response to non-compliance.

There is no question that the infant Government of South Sudan is struggling to transform itself from a rebel movement to a representative government and civilian-controlled army, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has been slow to consolidate control and deliver a peace dividend that is direly needed. The army suffers from a lack of command and control over poorly disciplined soldiers, who are periodically a source of grievance to the people they are tasked to defend. Courts and customary chiefs lack capacity to mediate disputes. Also, local security forces are under-equipped and stretched thin to well serve the civil society. Another problem is that the market for small arms thrives with strong demand and supply, undermining stability and threatening the fragile peace.

As part of its campaign to consolidate its power and improve security, the Government of South Sudan has from time to time engaged in civilian disarmament. During the first half of 2006 the SPLA conducted a forcible civilian disarmament operation in northern Jonglei State that collected 3,000 weapons. But the campaign was ethnically focused and politically motivated, not based on community-level security dynamics. The approach was militaristic, poorly planned, and included few security guarantees. For these reasons, some of the target community rebelled and more than 1,600 lives were lost in the ensuing battle. For example, my homeland state of Jonglei campaign turned into one of the bloodiest military actions in

South Sudan since the end of the second civil war; however the endeavor failed to improve long-term security of the state.

As that experience illustrated, DDRR program in South Sudan is complex and hazardous. While reducing the circulation of small arms is essential in order to yield a peace dividend, disarming the civilian population in a fragile post-conflict environment presents many challenges. The Jonglei experience showed that the GoSS's narrow tactics were not tied to a broader strategy of building community security by addressing the root causes of conflict. It also demonstrated that decisions about how to address insecurity and weapons proliferation were made by a small number of high-level actors operating under political and budgetary constraints. For these reasons, the GoSS's history of civilian disarmament efforts has been limited in scope and yielded mixed results.

Clearly, the DDRR was poorly planned, highly decentralized, and inadequately supported by the GoSS. Furthermore, the lack of overarching policy or clear legal framework and implementation was erratic and outcomes widely diverse. Five out of the ten states largely ignored the directive. State officials in Warrap reported that 15,000 weapons were collected, but it has not been confirmed that all of these weapons were obtained during the disarmament period. Besides, no other states where research was conducted have formally announced yet how many arms were actually collected. The top-down order, as opposed to bottom-up initiative was backed by little consultation and few resources, the narrowly defined DDRR initiative failed to build partially because the civil society was not engaged or provided any incentives in order to buy into the program. The decentralized nature of the campaign reinforces concerns that the GoSS's overall policy to increasingly 'devolve' administration to the states is translating into uneven and, in places, ineffective governance.

Fortunately however, the process was largely non-violent, mainly due to weak implementation in many areas. Even though, there were number of violent outbreaks in Lakes State, where SPLA soldiers went on a rampage in the state capital that enflamed political tensions and weakened security, and in Eastern Equatoria State, where disarmament in two villages flared into violence that killed at least 8 SPLA soldiers and 11 civilians. Overall, the SPLA's participation revived questions about the army's training, discipline, and respect for the rule of law, and command and control procedures. Initial evidence suggests that disarmament had little or no impact on armed violence among southern civilians, particularly inter-

clan clashes over access to resources during the dry season.

Another problem is the lack of communication, information collection, and collaboration were key constraints on the disarmament campaign. Crucially, President Kiir's order was issued before the Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSSAC) Bureau had obtained a legal mandate and could play an active role in coordinating the process. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) participated in the campaign by monitoring disarmament, assisting the CSSAC Bureau to become operational, providing storage containers for collected weapons, and generally promoting a peaceful disarmament. However, the coercive aspect of the campaign circumscribed the scope of the UN's contribution. In the CPA implementation period, there has been declining confidence between the signatory partners, rising mistrust between the SPLM and National Congress Party. Additionally, the collapse of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) peace process created a difficult climate for civilian disarmament, particularly in the oil-producing areas along the contested North-South border.

The stated objective of the presidential *operational order* was to have civilians in all ten states within South Sudan 'peacefully' turn over firearms to state authorities and SPLA forces within a six-month period. However, the order did not call for the collection of ammunition. According to the order, DDRR was to be conducted jointly by the state authorities and the SPLA, but both have not been successful needing outside help. Hence, the GoSS officials subsequently clarified to UN officials that the army would be providing background security and support for the operation, while state authorities would have overall responsibility for designing and implementing the process. Despite the desire for a peaceful process, the SPLA was authorized to use 'appropriate force' against anyone who refused to relinquish a weapon. Similar to previous disarmament campaigns, then, the order provided for coercive measures.

Moreover, the order provided a rather oblique legal basis for the disarmament campaign. The Interim Constitution provided by the CPA, referred to in the decree, indicates that the president of the GoSS who is both the head of the southern government and commander-in-chief of the SPLA, perhaps made a miscalculated endeavor with this particular approach of the DDRR. For instance, article 159(2) states that the permanent ceasefire provided for by the CPA shall be 'internationally monitored and fully respected by all persons in South Sudan'. The implication appears to be that armed

civilians are an inherent threat to the ceasefire. Beyond these provisions, the order gave no legal basis for disarmament. Whether there is in fact a legal basis for civilian disarmament is unclear. In fact, currently there is no clear South Sudan firearms law, however there are range of provisions in the Interim Constitution and in pre-CPA law that are relevant to questions of civilian arms possession and control.

Finally, there is the ambiguous section of the CPA that allows for the 'disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed'. Regardless of these possible precedents, President Kiir's order was an executive decree based on his authority rather than any specific legal provisions. I think the order was purely militarized for the campaign, and did not address the need to reduce armed violence or a desire to make communities weapons free with a civilian approach. This reflects the fact that the GoSS had not yet developed a policy framework for addressing issues of civilian small arms control, including disarmament, although some policy development work went on in parallel to the DDRR campaign.

In retrospect, the only directions given on the mechanics of disarmament were that all collected weapons must be registered and that both the state governors and the SPLA divisional commander in each state must send 'routine reports on the progress of the operation'. By doing so, I think that the responsibility for designing and implementing the disarmament process was entirely delegated to state authorities and SPLA forces, which explains the widely different outcomes in each of the states. Notably, although the order gave responsibility for implementation to both state authorities and the SPLA, it did not mandate training on how to conduct a peaceful disarmament process.

That said, what is clear is that the order took a narrow approach to the problem of small arms control, focusing solely on the collection of firearms. There was no mention of security provisions for disarmed communities or compensation for turned in weapons. The very short timetable is also telling. Six months is more appropriate for a focused military operation than a complex, ongoing effort covering an area of more than 500,000 square kilometers. By creating a highly decentralized process where authority for implementation is delegated to states, the order did not attempt to create any coordination mechanisms among state authorities to deal with issues such as cross-border cattle raiding and insecurity related to dry season migrations.

Actors and Interests



South Sudan – Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA)

While the order covered all of South Sudan, the actual motivation appears to have come from one specific state. The actual timing of the order came about due to pressure from the governor of Jonglei State. Faced with previous failed disarmament campaigns and pervasive insecurity, Governor Kuol sought authority to conduct another weapons collection operation that would target areas and groups that had not been disarmed previously, particularly the Murle, before the start of the dry season in 2008. The governor goal was to use DDR to improve security, facilitate economic activity, and ensure peaceful CPA-mandated elections in 2009. In addition to these state-level interests, the GoSS and SPLA also aimed at the civilian disarmament to defuse an increasingly precarious security environment in South Sudan as a whole.

Nevertheless, confidence in the CPA and trust between the SPLM and the NCP was at its lowest point since the agreement was signed at the wake of the DDRR program, and there were accusations regarding arms supplies. President Kiir's order was issued while Abyei, a strategically central border town in an oil-rich area, was still smoldering after destabilizing clashes between the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces. The North-South border demarcation process had stalled with neither side conceding ground. Instead, the area had become increasingly militarized.

On the other hand, with International Criminal Court arrest warrants pending against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, ongoing disputes over census results and border demarcation, and slow preparations casting increasing doubt on the presidential, parliamentary, and legislative elections slated for 2009, there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty over the 2011 referendum on southern self-determination. Within this fragile context, the

SPLM/A has a clear interest in strengthening its position in advance of 2011. The SPLM would like to consolidate control by delivering a peace dividend of services, economic development, and political stability, particularly prior to the 2009 elections. Faced with pervasive insecurity, the SPLA is also seeking to gain a monopoly on the use of force, neutralize potential spoilers, and fend off threats from the North while preventing internal fragmentation.

Although it is presented as the result of consultation with stakeholders, President Kiir's order does not make clear which parties were consulted, under what circumstances, and whether the order represents a consensus of any kind. In fact, the recent trend towards fragmentation and divisiveness within the higher ranks of the GoSS suggests that different personalities in the government—representing different interests and constituencies—had conflicting ideas about the nature, goals, and prospects for civilian disarmament that remained unresolved at the time of the order. A lack of coordination between the president and vice president's offices played out most tellingly with regard to the CSSAC Bureau.

The UN took several actions to assist the process. First, to secure weapons collected during the disarmament and ensure that they did not leak back into the South Sudan states supplied on the explicit condition that only weapons collected voluntarily, not coercively, would be stored in their facilities. The role of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in the campaign was justified in the MoU by reference to its CPA-designated mandate on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDRR). Secondly, to more effectively support and monitor a peaceful disarmament, UNMIS launched a regional planning cell to enhance coordination and information sharing between the UN military and UN police and civilian sections. Thirdly, UNMIS officials helped facilitate a meeting among the state governors to coordinate their disarmament efforts. Fourthly, UNMIS worked at the GoSS and state levels to promote a peaceful disarmament. Finally, both UNDP and UNMIS worked to help build the community-driven mandate and capacity.

The campaign presented the UN with several serious constraints, however. The Government of South Sudan did not consult the UN before the order was issued. While UNMIS attempted to develop its internal capacity to share information and monitor disarmament, there were no formal mechanisms for information sharing and coordination between the UN and state authorities. Finally, the threat of force that underlay the nominally voluntary disarmament meant that the UN could not become too closely associated with an initiative that could result in

violence similar to the one that occurred in Jonglei state in 2006. In January 2009 the GoSS Council of Ministers resolved that civilian disarmament should continue and that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should commit additional police forces to assist in the operation. The Council provided no further comment on the campaign so far, however, nor called for any alterations to its implementation. As of today, neither has President Kiir's order been officially extended or replaced.

In fact, if the actual goals were to consolidate power prior to elections or to diffuse escalating militarization it is questionable whether this kind of campaign was an appropriate strategy to adopt. Without a real plan, a transparent rationale, and wide consultation both within the government and targeted communities, any disarmament effort is vulnerable to abuse, above all through selective targeting. It is important to recall in this context that key players in the SPLA and GoSS have long histories in the civil war, support from different constituencies, and numerous and competing interests. The politicized nature of civilian disarmament in South Sudan has long been apparent.

Indeed, the lack of coordination within the GoSS and the manner in which the campaign was managed are indicative of wider governance challenges within the post-conflict South Sudan. Lack of coordination between the president and vice president's offices appears to have hindered the development of the administrative body tasked with clarifying the policy framework and modalities of the campaign. It was only towards the end of the six-month effort that the CSSAC Bureau finally obtained funding and established a physical presence outside of Juba. Should disarmament continue—and early indications are that it will, an expanded role for the Bureau with a transparent mandate would be welcomed by a range of stakeholders, including targeted community members.

The Government of South Sudan's policy of decentralization is also important to consider. Notably, several states declined to implement the order at all. As far as is known, this has not had any specific political repercussions, which says much about the lack of cohesive governance in South Sudan. In the end, the government's 2008 disarmament effort may reveal as much about the state of decision-making and governance in South Sudan as it does about its overarching security objectives, as this is a problem in post-conflict where DDR program is not well planned. That said, it remains to be seen whether continued disarmament campaigns will follow a similar flawed pattern, but the hope is that South Sudan government will continue to excel in the transition period and become

even a better autonomous entity pending the referendum in 2011 when South Sudan will be able to enjoy the revenues of the natural resources to fund programs such as the DDRR, and economic development as a whole.

Conclusion

The three-country scenario dealt with in this project is a recognition of the adverse impact conflicts have had on the continent, and the need to formulate a working DDRR program based on the lessons from the two success stories – Liberia and Sierra Leone, as part of the ongoing conflict resolutions efforts at both continental and international levels. Even though it is fair to say that the Government of South Sudan has come a long way and thriving, considering the decades of Civil War, President Kiir's DDRR disarmament order continues the tradition of incompletely planned and non-transparent civilian disarmament initiatives in South Sudan. The order was issued in the absence of the necessary legal and policy frame- works, with poorly defined objectives, and without adequate guidelines (for either the state governors or the SPLA) on how to implement it. Indeed, the manner in which the campaign was conceived, for instance, in consultation with just a few powerful individuals within the GoSS and SPLA, raises many questions about the motivations underlying it, and the ability of Kiir's 'infant' government.

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