

Logic of Pierce as discussed by your kind self: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness

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Abstract: From a semiotic understanding in Pierce's philosophy, you have tried to explain a philosophy of evolution in this paper. You have specified that it is not an atomic materialism. As mentioned by you it is a process philosophy which goes beyond both material-deterministic mechanism as well as pure chance indeterminism and Cartesian dualism. You have explained that Peirce achieved this by creating a pragmaticist and semiotic framework of trans-disciplinary cognition, communication and knowledge development through the three new philosophical categories, viz., conceptions of *First*, *Second* and the *Third*. The *First* is the being or the conception of existing independent of everything else, the *Second* is the conception of being relative to or the reaction. And the *Third* is the conception of mediation where, by the *First* and the *Second*, it is brought into relation. About biology you quote Peirce, "In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting is *First*, heredity is *Second*, the process whereby the accidental characters become fixed is *Third*. Chance is *First*, Law is *Second*, the tendency to take habits is *Third*." And this is Peirce's principle of Cosmogonic Philosophy, which is a model for the coming into being or existence of Universe and the sentient beings. However in highlighting these it might have been important to mention that Peirce had retrieved the final causation of Aristotle within his framework. It is the modern scientists who do not include *telos* or final causation in their mechanical framework because they think it is in conflict with the efficient causation as well as it brings the idea that somehow the future effects the present (i.e. reversing the temporal order). Peirce thinks that the modern neglect of final causation is due to nominalism.

[hakti Vijnana Muni. xxx. *Rep Opinion* 2016;8(3):39-47]. ISSN 1553-9873 (print); ISSN 2375-7205 (online). <http://www.sciencepub.net/report>. 6. doi: [10.7537/marsroj08031606](https://doi.org/10.7537/marsroj08031606).

Keywords: philosophy; evolution; materialism; Cosmogonic; Universe

Namaste. It was nice to read your paper [1] that you have referred in your email. From reading it we get some impressions which we will try to address. Your view is aligned to the non-dualist views of Sripad Sankaracharya. For developing a worldview towards the question of evolution, you admit that Darwinian view does not have enough explanatory power [2].

However when we take from the Vedantic view we must try to be aware of the full development and significance of the Philosophical Thinking in Vedanta. Sripad Sankaracharya fulfills only a necessary need at a particular time, place and focused at a particular audience. Before the full fledged concept of theism could be reintroduced in India in its full fledged glory, the voidism of Buddhism needed to be critiqued and that great service has been done by Sripad Adi Sankaracharya. And that is why he is a teacher to whom all Vedantists are indebted forever.

In Scientific education there are teachers for class 1 and then for class 2 and like that for graduation and also there are still higher teachings that lead to a PhD. Then why not the same can be true in the development of the Spiritual and Vedantic thought? Why should we think that we as Mankind are able to grasp the entirety of all the spiritual teachings from only one teacher? Therefore in the Vedantic thought if we neglect the further development brought in by

Sripad Ramanujacharya, Sripad Madhvacharya, Sripad Vishnuswami, Sripad Nimbarka Acharya and Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, we will miss its most essential concept which is the full fledged theistic concept, which has been taught in its topmost glory in the soil of India.

The Absolute Truth is not an Indeterminate Truth. Further *Brahman* is not the same as *atman* or the individual soul. The world is a perverted reflection of the spiritual world. It has been compared to an imperishable tree whose roots are upwards. But this does not mean that the individual soul is an illusion. All these topics have been conclusively proven by the great sage Srila Vyasadeva when he explained that 'It is Not Impossible to Describe the Brahman or the non-dual Absolute Truth' in his composition that is well known as *Vedanta Sutra*. Further he clarified all the topics of *Vedanta sutra* in his own commentary which is well known as *Srimad Bhagavatam*, which is considered as the authentic explanation of *Vedanta Sutra*.

Logic of Pierce as discussed by your kind self: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness

From a semiotic understanding in Pierce's philosophy, you have tried to explain a philosophy of evolution in this paper. You have specified that it is not an atomic materialism. As mentioned by you it is a process philosophy which goes beyond both material-

deterministic mechanism as well as pure chance indeterminism and Cartesian dualism [3]. You have explained that Peirce achieved this by creating a pragmatist and semiotic framework of trans-disciplinary cognition, communication and knowledge development through the three new philosophical categories, viz., conceptions of *First*, *Second* and the *Third*. The *First* is the being or the conception of existing independent of everything else, the *Second* is the conception of being relative to or the reaction. And the *Third* is the conception of mediation where, by the *First* and the *Second*, it is brought into relation. About biology you quote Peirce, "*In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting is First, heredity is Second, the process whereby the accidental characters become fixed is Third. Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.*" And this is Peirce's principle of Cosmogonic Philosophy, which is a model for the coming into being or existence of Universe and the sentient beings [3, 4].

However in highlighting these it might have been important to mention that Peirce had retrieved the final causation of Aristotle within his framework. It is the modern scientists who do not include *telos* or final causation in their mechanical framework because they think it is in conflict with the efficient causation as well as it brings the idea that somehow the future effects the present (i.e. reversing the temporal order). Peirce thinks that the modern neglect of final causation is due to nominalism. It was a doctrine that he tried to overcome all his life. He says, "... *the non-recognition of final causation ... has been and still is productive of more philosophical error and nonsense than any or every other source of error or nonsense. If there is any goddess of nonsense, this must be her haunt* [5]." For many people final cause as a purpose in human is somewhat acceptable but they just cannot harmonize the concept of final cause as an end, for in this case it would mean that nature itself has a purpose. Peirce was very fond of Aristotle's idea of *dynamis* (dynamis) and *energeia* (actuality). For Aristotle *dynamis* is always used together with and as opposed to *energeia*. Peirce said that these concepts of causation of Aristotle, "*has proved marvelously fecund.*[6]"

There is a unity in causation among these four aspects. Because *dynamis* and *energeia* are always together and opposed to each other, it proves the inherent unity of the four kinds of causes of Aristotle. Modern concept of mechanism attempts to break this unity. Yet it is a fact that final cause remains integral and hidden foundation of all causal explanations including mechanisms. In this regard Peirce says, "*Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final*

causation: it is blank nothing...."an efficient cause, detached from a final cause in the form of aw, would not even possess efficiency." This is one of the main reasons why Darwin's theory of evolution lacks the explanatory power as noted by you also [2].

As far as the *Firstness*, it is explained many a times as *pure chance* (albeit of a mental kind), Peirce meant as a pure uncaused event (not a mechanical event). By pure chance he explained, "*pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within the narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really sui generis and new can be accounted for.* [7]" He expresses such an opinion in his treatise the *doctrine of necessity* in which he proposed to examine the common belief that every single event in nature is precisely determined by law.

This is a very important observation of Peirce because from even the Vedantic worldview life is not described as an inferior material phenomenon. Rather life is explained as the principle of self-determination and is produced from the superior energy of *Brahman*. Therefore *Brahman* has internal qualities and self-determinations and is not an utter indeterminate reality. Life is not a result of the permutation and combination of atoms, molecules or waves or Laws of material nature. Therefore life can't be described by chemistry, physics or mathematics. Even Quantum Mechanics is not an explanation for life because it is has a deterministic expression (Schrödinger equation) for reality.

Thus it becomes very important to understand that according to Peirce no event is actually fully determined by law. There is an element of irreducible novelty in each and every event. Conclusion is that Reality can never be explained in terms of deterministic laws and we need the concept of life to even begin the process of Reality and the process of Universe. Modern science must examine its principle of causality as it is incomplete without including the life processes as being fundamental to causation especially by reexamining and realizing that causality as explained by Aristotle is an inseparable unity of final cause, formal cause, efficient cause and material cause. Aristotle's hylomorphism relation to evolution does not account for new as hylomorphism does not admit accidental events (forms). The evidence is not there that forms diverge, rather they continue within the bounds of their concept (species).

Peirce defines *Firstness* as "the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else." Needless to say, many have interpreted this according to monistic views.

However Spinoza properly understood the concept of the Absolute Substance as *Causa Sui* or which is self caused. But this need not mean that it is a monistic substance. Hegel defined the Absolute as By Itself and For Itself. The concept of self determination is the characteristic of all life. Life is its own principle. Free will, choice, self determination can never be explained in terms of laws. In Vedanta the definition of Absolute is that which is cause of all causes and He is the cause of Himself. For the Absolute, there is no cause outside of itself for its being. He is therefore not only Substance but also He is Personal. Thus the *Firstness* of Peirce can never be extended to any monistic being or substance. This will be clearer when we study the development of Vedantic Philosophy in India after Shankar. Shankar was successfully well critiqued by all the subsequent acharyas of Vedanta shastra.

Concept of Tychism and Manifestation of World from Pure Chance

As explained by you, Tychism is the doctrine of absolute chance as a factor in the universe. You have also noted Pierce statement that there are critics who cannot accept the *Firstness* of things that are perfectly dead and material. Peirce says he is with these critics. He states very clearly that whatever is *First* is *Ipsa facto* Sentient. So from here you have deduced quite correctly that Pierce's *Firstness* is quite apart from the modern scientific ontological physicalism that posits matter as the ultimate reality. So the *Firstness* of Chaos is not just a turmoil of possibilities but also of emotions as *qualia*.

From here you proceed to build an objective idealist ontology. So tychism admits the *Firstness* of emotions as *qualia* is the source of evolutionary cosmology in Peirce's worldview. In this all the regularities of mind and nature are regarded as products of growth. This holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. So accordingly you mention that Peirce's semiotic pragmatism is a unique transdisciplinary framework that encompasses science and spirituality without compromising any one of them – Logic, Natural Science and the holistic evolutionary process philosophy. So his idea is quite opposite to that of the mechanists who start with universal laws and try to explain everything by applying initial conditions upon them. For Peirce it is therefore 'law' that rather needs to be explained, i.e. the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. Then you explain that the category of *Firstness* is prone to lead to Tychism and that is necessary to establish the evolutionary ontology. Thus law in modern science cannot be viewed as absolute orderliness but only a certain degree of regularity that Peirce calls habit taking in cosmogony.

Thus what this means is that pure chance (*Firstness*) is inherent with a tendency to take habit. Then the *Firstness* which is total freedom seems to be almost outside time and space. Now here you make some vital propositions about *Firstness* and possibility. You say it can go through all possible forms without any hindrance leading to the scenario of the creation of a manifest world with its developing atoms and things that are regulated by habits. But what is not clear is the detailed nature of the *Firstness*, which you think must be indeterminate. But the details about the internal determinateness of this *Firstness* is not well probed here, while it is well taken that it is not determined by any externality or law.

In this philosophy, habits appears almost as universal laws although the laws themselves are still developing. There is no cause or reason behind the creation of a manifest world from a *Firstness* of all possibilities. The only thing is that a manifested universe is a possibility among many that is tested. These leads to the manifestation of concrete phenomenon like force and will, which is *Secondness* and they are the immediate differences between phenomenon and things. This is called *haecceity* by Peirce that indicates the arbitrary *here* and *now*-ness of existence, for example a person's or object's *this*-ness which are facts based upon relations and cannot be themselves further explained in terms of individual phenomenon. All these deductions are from Vedantic viewpoint inconsistent in many ways.

From the Vedantic viewpoint, the category of law indicates a lawmaker. Thus behind the laws of nature there is a rational domain and it is thought, which is foundational. Vedanta explains that Brahman is *Raso vai sahor* the Abode or the Nectarean Ocean of All Transcendental Mellows. Brahman is highly personal truth. But the realizations of sages are different and so they sometimes describe *Brahman* from their partial realizations and different ways which are not always equipped to clarify the full aspect of the revealed truth. Hence it is the advice of Srila Vyasa-deva, the great sage that a sincere inquisitive student must take up the comparative study of Vedantic literature and gradually he will discover hidden jewels and higher and higher aspects of truth by mercy of the Supreme because it is the nature of the Supreme to help everyone. In Peirce the laws of nature are often compared to habit. But that does not explain the finer aspects of reality like the rising of Sun from east and seasons and nature of consciousness. The laws should not be taken as something that merely becomes fixed by some regularities in nature. In the *Bhagavad Gita* the Lord clearly mentions that nature is being governed under His directions. However the idea can be adjusted by understanding that the laws are subordinate to the

Personal truth. However that does not mean that tiny living entities like us can be the lawmakers of Nature. We are dependent principle on a higher life principle. But the Absolute Truth is only Independent Real and therefore all laws are sanctioned by Him. Everything - life or material principle follows His directives.

You talk about something called evolutionary love (agapism) with respect to divine. However the explanation of love is that these are directives about the essence of one's own being. Since Peirce talked about such an idea it is indeed very interesting. In Vedanta also Srila Sridhar Maharaja talked about the subjective evolution of consciousness [19]. So it is the consciousness of the living entity which is evolving and not the bodies. The essential being is the thinking, willing and feeling being. Therefore if we must talk about evolution, then it must be the evolution of our thought. Our thought must come to harmony with the divine and only in that sense Vedanta talks about the principle of evolution. The world is not controlled by chance of Darwin. And from Peirce we can only gather that his idea of the pure chance or *Firstness* has the being of the quality of life, which is not determined by any law that is external to it. Then this has to have the nature of free will. Vedanta offers many insights by which such principles of philosophers can be properly harmonized. The idea of *Firstness* indicates something of the superiority of life but it does not yet explain the full diversity of the phenomenon of life. So we need more directions about the nature of life.

These explanations would require a greater detail of understanding about the nature of the *Firstness* itself. Peirce has already accepted Final Cause in his logic. These classical concepts of teleology had been articulated by Plato. Further they have been very clearly explained by Aristotle. As we have already explained Peirce tried his whole life overcoming the dismissal of the final cause. Peirce tried to overcome the doctrine of necessitarianism or determinism when he talked about absolute chance. Teleology in Peirce's definition is clearly against the deterministic doctrine of mechanism. This anti necessitarianism he called as Tychism. Therefore we need to understand that this has meaning with respect to the pure spontaneity which is the characteristic of life and not of deadened matter. Thus to clearly understand tychism we are forced to understand the deeper explanation of life means. Spinoza with whose concepts Peirce was well influenced explained the Absolute Substance as *Causa Sui* or which is self determined or which has no cause outside of itself.

Quantum Mechanics and Tychism

Now you draw a similarity with modern quantum mechanics here. You explain that particles-waves have only certain probability or tendency to exist

when measured and this aspect is described more lawfully than any other physical processes that we know of. However we cannot describe the actual individual phenomenon any better. Thus it is not possible to talk of say an individual particle in nature. We can't talk about particles in any absolute sense. For such material principles the law applies to a measurement that is applied to an actual huge ensemble. This is *Secondness* and is closer to the concept of *Haecceity* of Peirce, which are unexplainable in terms of individual or singular events. Quantum mechanics can only posit a probabilistic model for these thousands of events and this would be the *Thirdness* of Peirce's model. The single event is undeterminable in terms of Quantum mechanics and thus breaks from the Classical Physics and in this way comes closer to Peirce's paradigm. We would like to add here that modern quantum mechanics has shown that naïve realism is not an explanation of the observed phenomenon. The observer and the observed are inseparable. The famous Copenhagen which is till date the best explanation for QM, explains that the wave function describes our knowledge of the electron and not the electron directly. Further the Zeilinger issues have come to question any naive realistic interpretation of QM. That means the laws are applicable to matter within limits and are not absolute in themselves. However this does not mean that there is no individuality as experienced in life. QM per say is not a theory of life. Further the laws do not explain life as they cannot be applied to the principle of self determination. This only means that we need a more conceptual understanding of life. Yet it is not an explanation to say Reality is unexplainable. The *Firstness* of reality is of the quality of life or pure spontaneity and not caused by matter: that much can be agreed.

The empiricist philosophy claims that our ideas come from direct experience of things or the idea of logical positivism. You have quite correctly said w.r.t logical positivism, "It implies individual piece of data can be known directly in themselves without the knowledge of associated concepts. This form of modern logical positivism which you term in your article as modern dataism is definitely quashed by the development of concepts of QM. We cannot talk about one particle or even many particle systems. Rather in the quantum field theory the particles of nature are considered as quanta of relativistic quantum fields.

Here you bring in the idea of the contrast contained in the concept of *synechism*, a philosophical term proposed by Peirce. The world's foundation is a plenum or field where everything is connected to everything else in hyper complexity implying all knowledge is fallible. Therefore Truth is a possibility

through science and is an ideal limit where the irritation of doubt becomes settled with the means we have. Therefore truth will always be provisional.

You have also clarified that the core of Peirce's philosophy is semiotics which is a sign process of reasoning connecting our "inner" and "outer" worlds. This view also contrasts Peirce away from Kant's idea of an unknowable "*Ding* and *sich*" (The thing-in-itself). Thus Peirce's idea of evolution is intertwined with a theory of signification, cognition, and communication that unites meaning and rationality. In this he differs from Darwin who did not consider the role of consciousness in evolution. Peirce's logic adds abductive logic, in addition to the deductive logic as well as inductive logic.

Unnecessary Conflating Non-Dualism of Shankara with Firstness of Peirce

You have mentioned that "Peirce's point is that God is real (as *Firstness*), but does not exist as an entity that interacts with others. But what God is might be revealed at the end of man's systematic inquiry and the further development of the universe. If, through this process of inquiry, we converge towards a stability of meaning, we have reached the Peircean final interpretant. In Peirce's philosophy, God as thirdness is agape or evolutionary love, which makes the universe grow evolutionarily by taking habits just like the symbols mentioned earlier. Therefore, an aspect of the tokens of God is the body of laws developing through evolution. [8]"

Further you go on to say, "Peirce's view of God or the divine is a pantheism which I have already described in Brier. Pantheism can be viewed as pantheism combined with the idea of a transcendental reality beyond time and space – a pure zero as Peirce calls it – that cannot be spoken of but, still, is somehow the source of everything. It is a fundamental notion for Shankara's nondual Advaita Vedanta. [9]"

According to Vedanta of Sripad Ramanujacharya and Sripad Madhvacharya as well as Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, Shankara's position is untenable. Shankara has considered Vedanta very selectively and does not include the entire body of Vedanta. Shankara philosophy is called *vivartavaad*, which implies an apparent modification of Brahman. The philosophy of Gaudiya Vedanta Vaisnavism is *shakti-parinaamavaad*, which means the philosophy of the transformation of the potency of the Absolute Truth, or Brahman. Lord Chaitanya Mahaprabhu critiques *vivartavaad* of Shankara because it ultimately neglects the Names, Forms, Attributes, Pastimes, Associates, Paraphernalia and Abodes of the Lord or the Absolute Truth. Peirce's *Firstness* is qualitative. It is indeterminate only in the sense that material laws cannot describe them. So we need to be careful in interpreting these assertions. According to Peirce,

"Firstness may be manifested by quality, feeling, freedom, and multiplicity, and is a quality [10]". But when we see this definition of Peirce it is clearly incompatible with Sripad Shankaracharya's concept of Monism as it does not admit multiplicity or admits it as a mere illusion. So the Firstness of Peirce cannot be compared with Shankaracharya. There are important differences in it.

Evolutionary Logic is opposed to the idea of Aristotle's Hylomorphism

The forms of the living entities continue within the species definition. There is no evolutionary evidence that the forms have changed beyond the species line. There are no accidental life forms. The established fossil record indicates sudden appearance or sudden disappearance and long long stasis. So where are the new forms in the fossil record? Secondly the extended fossil record which was intended to show a Tree of Life based upon morphology is not confirmed by the phylogenetic analysis. So the extended fossil record is not being confirmed by theory. Hence Aristotle's hylomorphism remains a proven concept of species line even by modern evidence of fossil records.

Critique of Vedanta of Sripad Sankara by Sripad Ramanuja Acharya

Sripad Ramanujacharya in his commentary of Vedanta Sutra called the *Sri Bhasya*, rejected the three main claims of Shankara [11]. Ramanujacharya critiqued Shankara's stand that (i) Brahman is non-differentiated pure consciousness, that the (ii) universe is unreal and that the (iii) souls are non-enduring existent and that the individual souls are dissolved during liberation [11]. According to Ramanuja, Brahman is not an utter indeterminate existence and rather Brahman is the form of Being, Consciousness and Bliss. Brahman is not formless. Brahman is not at all an utter indeterminate being as conceived by the followers of Shankara. That implies Brahman has no meaning unless its constituent terms have their meanings. Its constituent terms have no meaning if they are not differentiable from their opposites, viz., non-being, non-consciousness and non-bliss [11].

Now the thing is Shankara accepts the Vedanta Shastras (scriptures) and therefore he should be basing his arguments upon the concepts of Vedanta Sastras. However Shankara covers the original meanings and gives his own imaginary explanations. It is here Ramanuja rejects Shankara's concept of Utter Indeterminism of Brahman by drawing conclusions based upon these very Shastras.

There are many injunctions of the Shastras that prove that Brahman has qualities and attributes. They do not suggest that these are merely provisional facts about Brahman. There can be nothing that has an attribute and yet be an utter indetermination.

Therefore the only conclusion is that Brahman is self differentiated. When Shastras say that Brahman is without any qualities or attributes in some places, it only means that Brahman has no material attributes. For example shastras say that Brahman is beyond the perceptive power of the senses, it is colorless, Brahman has no material body and is ungraspable. In all these references, it only means that Brahman is rather transcendental to matter. He must therefore be differentiated. Brahman has super-excellent and all auspicious qualities. By virtue of these qualities he is differentiated from everything else. The *atman* has an identity with Brahman as a relation between part and whole of a Wholistic Being. Thus the identity part is only partial. Vedanta philosophy must be faithful to the totality of the scriptures [11].

However Shankara takes only a few statements selectively and makes them the basis of his whole philosophical treatise. The study and interpretation of Shastras cannot be based upon a blind faith. A proper conception must be able to withstand the proper and rigorous applications of grammar and logic. Further our sources of knowledge (Vedanta Shastra) does not permit that Brahman is an undifferentiated pure consciousness. The argument of non differentiation is only an appeal to the fallacy of ignorance. For example we can experience objects. However objects are always qualified by a difference. This proves that we cannot experience any undifferentiated object. The self is both a subject as well as an object. The two sides exist simultaneously. So to experience the object called self, we must admit differences and form. Consciousness is always directed to something, or consciousness is consciousness of something, which is necessarily directed to something that possesses a difference or distinction with it by which the object is apprehended or understood. Consciousness is always intentional, and presupposes personality (intent) and difference. Consciousness is explained in the scriptures as eternal and self luminosity (light of knowledge) and therefore it must have some difference from things that lack those qualities.

Perceptions are of two kinds, viz, determinate and indeterminate perceptions. Determinate perception always involves differentiated objects. For example when we see a cow we always see an object qualified by its generic nature or essence. When we first time see a cow we see it together with its generic essence. This thing here has a cow essence. We do not differentiate the individual cow and its generic essence because we have not seen other cows that have the same generic nature. So here the individual and the essence are undifferentiated, and yet the object of perception remains differentiated with respect to the other kinds or things. So Ramanuja Acharya has established that undifferentiated perceptions do not

mean an object devoid of all attributes, but they are only devoid of some attributes [11].

Now as perceptions always involve objects qualified by a difference, it means that inferences always involve a difference, because inference involves a relation between things that are objects of perception. Thus as all our sources including the shastras involve objects qualified by difference, we are not permitted through the sources of knowledge that there are undifferentiated objects. This is an inductive argument to prove that no undifferentiated object can exist [11].

Moreover the three qualities of Brahman, viz., being or existence, consciousness and bliss are also not one and the same in all respects. Existence is always an object of consciousness. Therefore Existence and Consciousness is not one and the same thing. Since by that which we grasp and object (consciousness) is different from the object we grasp (Existence), it means consciousness is not the same thing as existence. Moreover the self cannot be identical with pure consciousness because the self is really the knower. The knower is the substrate of consciousness and the true self has permanence or the continuity of existence. The knower can for example recall an object perceived earlier. But this persisting I or the self is not identical with consciousness because consciousness is not permanent and it changes. E.g., I was a child, I am a grown up, I forgot or I remember. Moreover sometimes consciousness can become dormant with no outward expression but still the feeling of I persists. For example after a deep sleep we say I slept happily and not that I was in pure consciousness in deep sleep [11].

Critique of Vedanta of Sripad Sankara by Sripad Madhvacharya

Many people including some in the later phases of Madhva School of Vedanta think that Sripad Madhvacharya advocates a form of Absolute dualism. Madhva used the dialectical methods of Nyaya-Vaisesika schools and this may have caused them to think so. However Madhva is not an advocate of absolute dualism [12]. His doctrine is based on the functions of *Visesas* or Identity-in-difference. He does not mean that every particle of matter and human beings has the same kind of existence on par with the Supreme Being. Rather his philosophy is based on the concept of One Independent Real as the supreme conclusion and all the rest as of secondary importance [12]. Madhva has preserved the homogeneity of Brahman in completeness without the need for sacrificing the infinite richness of its qualitative content [13]. And thus he has the more dynamic and colorful conception of Brahman. This he has achieved by the application of the principle of identity-in-difference. This needs a proper understanding of his

concept of *visesa* (identity-in-difference). Therefore Madhava has been given great credit by the followers of the Vaisnava schools of Vedanta and in Indian Philosophical development in general for achieving this extraordinary feat. His doctrine of *visesa* does not suffer from the short comings of identity cum difference or fictitious difference. It is through the inner resource of the substance itself and it replaces many worn-out and outmoded conceptions of time, space, causation and creation by more satisfactory ones. This is no small contribution to thought [13].

According to Sripad Madhvacharya, Sankara's Brahman cannot have any self awareness. Neither can we argue for an independence of being from that perspective. If we were to say that Sankara's Brahman has an independence of being, then that immediately disqualifies it of its so called utter indeterminateness. Sankara's philosophy becomes entangled in unreasonable and inextricable contradictions. Independence of being implies that the being must be independent of any other principle for its existence, its awareness of its own self and activity of being. It is not possible for Sankara's Brahman to have any self awareness. If this were so, it would contradict his philosophy by overlapping the subject and the predicate in the same act. Moreover this non-differentiated Brahman cannot have any self directed activity [14]. Madhvacharya accepts the realism of the non-Vedantic schools when they talk about the general principles of empirical realism like the reality of the world, the reality of difference, the reality of possibility of knowledge and the systems of proofs and distinction between matter and spirit [15].

The metaphysical dependence of the universe of Brahman is differently conceived in the different systems of Vedanta. Sankara equates it with an appearance. The world of appearance, which is superimposed on Brahman, would not be there but for the reality of Brahman. It has no existence outside or apart from Brahman. Madhva has no sympathy for this kind of monism of Sankara. Sankara's monism is indifferent to hopes and aspirations of man alike. Sankara's monism reduces the beautiful existence of the world of creation to an illusion without reality. Sankara does not admit any questions there not any necessity for answers there. So Madhva has critiqued these fallacies of Sankara. Moreover Madhva does not equate the souls or the world of matter to the same perfection as the Absolute. The souls and matter are real and they are not the result of any superimposition. Neither are they independent of God. God is greater than (transcendental to) His creation. At the same time God is as yet immanent in His creations [16]. When we emphasize the existence of subordinate reals side by side with the independence of Brahman, we have a dualism (identity in difference) but not any absolute

dualism. This is a theistic realism.

Man made in the Image of God,

In your paper you have alluded to this idea of Genesis, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.", and you quote a caveat of Pierce that "But does not this remark simply carry the doctrine back to the days when the gods were first made in man's image? [17]" So in other words as if it were an anthropomorphic idea of God. But if so that would be just an idol of our mind. However Sripad Madhvacharya has explained the concept of Bimba Pratibimavaad (Image and Reflection) to explain the truth that God is not merely a result of our anthropomorphic imposition on Reality. Actually this explains the very relation between God and the living entities through the function of the dependence of everything on His Being, which alone is the Independent Real. This explains the true nature of the dependence of the living entities on God. Sankara just explained that the jiva is a reflection of the Brahman on the mirror of *avidya* or ignorance. The term *pratibimba* or reflection will be completely misunderstood if it is taken in its popular meaning as an appearance brought about by a material or an external medium. In Madhva's siddhanta it is not in this sense that the concept of reflection is to be applied to the living entity. The living entities are not created and so the jivas are not reflections in this sense. That will be an error. The jivas are not actual reflections projected by Brahman like a concrete substance is reflected in a mirror. There is no external medium of reflection in this case. This is at once the difference between Sankara and Madhva. According to Sankara the Jiva is a reflection of Brahman and therefore this relation can be transcended. But according to Madhva the relation between God and Jiva as BimbaPratibima is inviolable and sacred. This relation will never be annulled and it goes to the very core of the constitution of the living entity and his essence. It is not a false relation. It is the truest and most permanent bond between the jiva and God and the purpose of philosophy is to realize this by progressive realization [18].

Now to explain the concept of Bimba Pratibima bhava, which is meant to bring out the permanent dependence of the living entity on God, Sripad Madhvacharya has given examples beginning with the idea of a man and his shadow in the upanishads. The two important features of a shadow are its dependence and its resemblance on the original object for its existence. Thus the living entities resemble the Brahman to some extent and at the same time are dependent on Brahman (part and parcel to whole relation.) The idea of shadow also implies that God is immeasurably much more than and superior to the living entity. At the same time God is the substantial

truth of all living entities. They are bound to the substance and vice versa. The living entities are dependent on God but not vice versa. The shadow is outwardly similar in form to the substance and therefore the souls also have the same form of reality, i.e., existence, knowledge and bliss resembling Brahman. This idea should not be stretched beyond dependence.

It is only an association of the physical idea of reflection and the presence of an external medium that creates the initial confusion about the concept of *Bimba Pratibimba Bhava*. There is no external reflecting medium between the living entity and the Brahman. If that were so it would immediately render the living entity impermanent. And this would curtail the relation of co eternity between the living entity and God as mentioned in the upanisads. Thus when we draw a simile we should be careful about the contrasts and similarities. Here the point of contact with this simile is the certain kinds of similarities that exist between the jiva and Brahman with respect of Eternity, knowledge and Bliss and the jiva depend on Brahman for those. The point of contrast are not being conditioned by an external medium like a mirror and not being destroyed upon the removal of the medium and not being a transient or lifeless effect. This relation is therefore eternal. And obviously the avidya of Sankara cannot be such a relation. Thus the medium is nothing external but is the internal medium which is the constituent elements of the selfhood operating as the internal medium acting on the power of *visesa* (the function of identity in difference) [18].

Definition of God and Form and teachings of Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu.

Madhva takes us to the highest limit of Divine transcendence. The Supreme is independent of all accessories of creation. The system of his philosophy is called Pure Dualism or Suddha Dvaita. Srīman Mahaprabhu took his line and revealed the highest nature of Eternity, Spiritual Knowledge and Bliss. This is the service conception of non-calculative dedication. His philosophy is called Inconceivable and simultaneous identity in identity and difference. The distinctions are not annulled ever and yet all functions of one limb can be performed by another limb of the Transcendental form of the Lord. He can accept the offerings of a devotee simply by seeing. He does not have to eat only by His mouth. Srīla Bhakti Rakshaka Sridhar Dev-Goswami Maharaja says in this regard, “And Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu says that the basis of reality is acintya bhedabheda, inconceivable bipolarity. Everywhere there is something common and something different. Whatever opposing points you may discuss will have something in common, and something different. Nothing is quite the same as anything else. And above all, the infinite is not within

your fist. It is inconceivable. The unified and differentiated character of reality is inconceivable; its secret is in the hand of the Supreme. It does not depend upon your whim. Still, that differentiated character of the Absolute will be seen differently according to the subjective relationship we have with Him. [19]”

Conclusions

(i) Sankara’s non dualism has been successfully critiqued by Sripad Ramanuja Acharya, Sripad Madhvacharya and Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu. Reality is not an undifferentiated Monism. Reality is well explained by the identity –in-difference of Sripad Madhvacharya and inconceivable and simultaneous identity in identity and difference of Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu.

(ii) Peirce’s idea of Firstness cannot be an utter indeterminateness in Shankara’s sense because he admits plurality.

(iii) Aristotle hylomorphism is still valid. Evolution cannot proceed independently of the Brahman. The Laws are not simply a result of habit or the laws are not merely an expression of apparent orderliness rising out of pure chance as everything is dependent on Brahman.

(iv) Reality is not formless. Distinction is the very nature of reality. Because distinctions are there in the very being of Brahman, Brahman has Form. Consciousness, Existence and Bliss are not wholly identical with each other in all respects. Since they are qualities of Brahman, it implies Brahman is its own Form.

(iv) If Peirce’s logic could be harmonized with that of Sripad Ramanuja, Sripad Madhvacharya and Sri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu then it will yield a more consistent and proper explanation of Reality.

(v) Tychism is the doctrine of pure chance or total freedom. But in the Vedantic concept the living entities have certain amount of free will with respect to reality. However they are not independent in an absolute sense and are dependent on the Brahman by their relation of *bimba pratibimba bhava*. Neither is the relation temporary but it is eternal. So Tychism is not the controller or destiny maker of the universe. Neither are the living entities free to evolve into whatever form without any hindrance. The forms in this world are dependent on the Form of the Spiritual World. Just as a reflection depends upon its relation with the image. The shadow is dependent on the form of the substance.

(vi) In Vedanta causality is most important. Things are not evolving by pure chance. But they are fully dependent in Brahman for its being and becoming. The only point is the living entities have some freedom to desire. This is the cause of their

different destinies.

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3/16/2016